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Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised
reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court per-
suasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and
subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated filings and a judge who aims
to always take appropriate action. In the model, management makes a preemptive
voluntary filing to retain control of the process, and thereby engage in a game of
Bayesian Persuasion with asymmetric information vis-à-vis the judge. This mecha-
nism endogenously results in the reorganization of some non-viable companies, and
exclusively management-initiated (i.e., voluntary) bankruptcy filings. This paper,
therefore, explains why non-viable companies could be permitted to reorganize and
why there are repeat offender firms that enter bankruptcy multiple times.
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1 Introduction
The process by which businesses exit the market is an important aspect of capitalist
economies.1 While some obsolete businesses simply get wound down, often a distressed
company does not quietly ride off into the sunset. Instead, financially distressed compa-
nies frequently undergo a last-ditch saving effort: undergoing a bankruptcy procedure
with the hope that debt reorganization will keep them afloat. These procedures are de-
signed to filter viable from non-viable businesses, as much as they are designed to satisfy
the claims of the creditors.2 Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) document, in
a study of various procedures and outcomes across the world, that different jurisdictions
have adopted a wide range of pro-creditor and pro-debtor policies. For the purposes
of the current study, however, the U.S. is of particular interest; not only because of its
sheer size but also because of the recent trend towards other jurisdictions introducing
procedures similar to Chapter 11 reorganizations into their bankruptcy codes.3
Approximately 99% of corporate bankruptcy cases in the U.S.4 result from volun-
tary filings; that is, management-initiated rather than creditor-initiated, legal action.
Hotchkiss (1995) documents that, of the companies that eventually emerge reorganized
from bankruptcy, 30-40%5 find themselves in financial dire straits again within 3 years
of emergence. Why does a court that has an explicit mandate to liquidate non-viable
businesses seem to have such a high error rate? The law, economics, and finance litera-
ture on the issue has considered bankruptcy court as an arena for structured bargaining
(as discussed in the survey paper by White (2005)). The theoretical model I present in
1Indeed, it is the latter half of Schumpeter’s famous “creative destruction.”
2See White (1989) for a discussion of filtering and filtering failure in bankruptcy court.
3Germany passed the Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen (Law for
further simplification of the rehabilitation of companies) in late 2011. It gives German bankruptcy law
a Chapter 11-like procedure. In recent years, other European jurisdictions have also adjusted their
bankruptcy codes in this direction.
4U.S. Court data available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_
import_dir/Table702_6.pdf and http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
Table7.03.pdf.
5In her sample, 32% of the reorganized companies file for bankruptcy again and a further 8% expe-
rience significant out-of-court restructuring.
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this paper looks at bankruptcy through a novel lens—that of persuasion. I argue that
the court’s reliance on management’s business judgment and commissioned reports can
result in the observed pattern of voluntary filings and high recidivism rates.
Under Title 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,6 there are two types of bankruptcy
outcomes—liquidation and reorganization. The former generally takes place under Chap-
ter 7 and the latter under Chapter 11.7 The filing party retains control of the company
throughout the bankruptcy process (via a trustee if the creditors have filed), and chooses
the venue and the chapter under which the filing takes place. That said, the judge is the
one who has authority on the final outcome (liquidation or reorganization), by, among
others, converting proceedings under one chapter into proceedings under the other. Much
of the focus in the bankruptcy literature has been on the strategic use of default as a
precursor to bankruptcy, and the negotiation dynamics once a company is undergoing
bankruptcy. Some models are silent on who the filing party is (e.g., Ellul and Pagano
(2016)) while others imply that the creditors are the ones initiating the legal action if one
is to take the equilibrium literally (e.g., Giammarino (1989)). Note that, for the issues
which these papers explain, the identity of the filer is unimportant. In my model identity
matters—not only for the purposes of negotiation leverage but also for the purposes of
influencing the actions of the judge.
Negotiation is only part of what takes place in bankruptcy court. If management has
filed for bankruptcy, then the judge relies on the business judgment of the incumbent
CEO and documentation that management produces. In equilibrium, management files
for bankruptcy exactly in order to engage in a persuasion game with the judge and
preempt the creditors from doing so. The purpose of this preemptive filing is control
of the process of producing and discovering information in court. This information is
ultimately used by the bankruptcy judge, who has significant sway on the process and
6Available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2016-title11/pdf/USCODE-2016-title11.
pdf.
7This is a slight and immaterial simplification of reality. For example, it is possible, albeit uncommon,
for liquidation to take place in Chapter 11.
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outcome of the case (LoPucki and Whitford, 1993). In many cases, the judge is able to
“cram down” and mandate a decision over the objections of many of the creditors.8 Given
this court dynamic, Bayesian Persuasion with asymmetric information is an appropriate
modeling choice: management, if it initiates bankruptcy, is given the power to set up the
information production and discovery mechanism that could eventually sway the judge’s
actions and thereby affect the payoffs of all parties.
The persuasion mechanism is simple and intuitive. When the management of a
company in financial distress senses that a trip to bankruptcy court is imminent, they
face the choice of filing or waiting for creditors to file. While the latter might prolong the
pre-bankruptcy period, the control repercussions of a creditor-initiated filing motivate
management to be the first one to file instead. Despite being better informed about the
true state of the company than outsiders, management is unable to change its strategy
based on that information advantage. At the end of the day, management makes an
optimal pooled choice of the auditing and reporting structure. This choice leads to
excessive reorganization as management has a clear preference for reorganization over
liquidation, despite management’s commitment to truthfully report the findings in an
audit and the judge’s best efforts to take the correct action.
1.1 Literature review
Several sources provide particularly useful summaries of the corporate bankruptcy schol-
arship, namely the survey papers by Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008)
and White (2005) and the anthology of papers edited by Bhandari and Weiss (1996).
One key tension described by the literature is between filtering out the viable companies
and satisfying creditor preferences. The former plays a role in economic efficiency argu-
ments about the procedure of bankruptcy—how does one differentiate companies that
have temporary problems from ones that have permanent ones? The latter looks how
8See section 1126 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. “Cramdown” is the technical legal term for the
judge’s forcing a decision over the objection of some creditors.
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ex post deviations from absolute priority when distributing claims and proceeds affects
a priori financing.
White (1994) analyzes filtering in U.S. Bankruptcy Court and identifies the Type I
and Type II errors committed in the process—the former being the reorganization of
non-viable entities and the latter the liquidation of viable ones. Some authors (e.g., Baird
(1987) and Bris, Schwartz, and Welch (2005)) have particularly attributed Type I errors
to the actions of biased judges and have even gone so far as to argue that a world without
bankruptcy (i.e., with liquidation auctions only) is a better world. Schoar and Chang
(2017) document that some judges may have a bias to liquidating or reorganizing across
their judicial history. Others have identified asymmetric information as the source of the
filtering failure (e.g., Giammarino (1989), Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn
(2008), and White (1994)). While the model I present here does feature asymmetric
information, it is not the cause of the filtering failure. Rather, management’s ability
to control a public experiment that produces a signal with respect to the true state of
viability of the company causes the filtering failure.
Several papers (e.g., Baird (1987), Jackson (1982), Baird and Jackson (1988), Baird
and Picker (1991)) focus on negotiation and bargaining leverage in bankruptcy. In par-
ticular, Adler, Capkun, and Weiss (2013) focused on the timing implications thereof.
Different procedures in an international context have been studies by Franks and Lo-
ranth (2014), Frieden and Wielenberg (2017) and White and Posner (1996). While
illuminating, these alternative procedures are not a focus of this paper. Povel (1999)
studied optimal “soft” and “hard” bankruptcy procedures to explain why in some juris-
dictions liquidation is more prevalent than in others. Gilson (1991) looks at the choice
between private workouts and Chapter 11 thereby focusing on the outside option of
management and the creditors if they decide to settle their differences out of court.
The recent literature on Bayesian Persuasion which forms the basic building block
of this mechanism began with the seminal work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),
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although the tools for this type of analysis have been available at least since Aumann
and Maschler (1995). The key insight of this strand of the literature is best understood
in juxtaposition to traditional signaling and screening models such as Crawford and
Sobel (1982). Unlike those models, which feature unraveling and “cheap talk,” Bayesian
Persuasion provides a means through which the sender of information could, under
certain conditions, influence the actions of the receiver. To this end, the sender commits
to a public experiment with an observable signal structure.
The literature has branched out to incorporate costly signaling (Gentzkow and Ka-
menica, 2014) and heterogeneous priors (Alonso and Câmara, 2016), but very few papers
have examined informational asymmetry (Hedlund (2017) and Perez-Richet (2014)). In
the context of bankruptcy filings, however, it is sensible to assume that management
is better, albeit not perfectly, informed than the other players. Unlike both of these
papers, the information structure in the model I examine is simpler, as it only allows for
a binary signal. Such a signal is natural in a bankruptcy court, where the reports argue
one side or the other rather than providing a probabilistic outlook. As a consequence
of this information structure, no refinements beyond Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium are
necessary for the model presented here. As in Perez-Richet (2014) but not in Hedlund
(2017), in my setting, there is no separating equilibrium despite the extra information
that the manager possesses.
In finance, the Bayesian Persuasion framework has been used to analyze voluntary
disclosure in bilateral transactions (Glode, Opp, and Zhang, 2017) and the market for
conflicted financial advice (Szydlowski and Chang, 2017).
The next section introduces the model and discusses Bayesian Persuasion and the
solution concept. Section 3 presents the solution of the model and Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
The model I describe here is a stylization and formalization of the relevant aspects of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The framework is more general, however, and can, with some
adjustments, be used to describe other jurisdictions. I will henceforth refer to the game
described below as the Bankruptcy Persuasion Game or BPG. The Bankruptcy
Persuasion Game focuses on three pertinent players: the manager (M), the bankruptcy
judge (J), and the creditor(s) (C),9 but abstracts from the presence of equityholders,
rank-and-file employees, customers, etc. Potential conflict among the creditors of multi-
creditor companies and between management and equityholders, while interesting and
relevant in their own right, are not the subject of this model.
The players play a game with respect to a distressed company, which is run by the
manager, financed by the creditors, and whose reorganization or liquidation may be de-
cided by the judge upon a bankruptcy filing. Despite experiencing distress, the company
may either be intrinsically economically viable or non-viable. Which of these true states
obtains is unknown to the players. If either the manager or the creditors decide to file for
bankruptcy, the matter is referred to the judge while the company is controlled by the
filing party (for the creditors via a creditor-appointed trustee) during the bankruptcy
process. The controlling party then appoints outside advisors (consultants, auditors, in-
vestment bankers, etc.) who produce a public signal about the viability of the company.
For brevity, I will refer to that public signal as an “audit” and define it more formally in
the next section. The court’s explicit objective is to ascertain as well as possible if the
company is worth saving (if viable) or not (if non-viable), while making strides towards
satisfying the creditors with the liquidation proceeds. The management’s objective is
to persuade the court to reorganize the company to preserve their lucrative occupation.
The creditors’ objective is to maximize financial returns.
9To make the exposition easier to follow, I will use the masculine form for the managers, the feminine
for the judge, and the plural for the creditor(s).
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More formally, the timeline and extensive form of the game are represented in Figures
1 and 2 respectively. The timeline is a simplified representation of the extensive form of
the game, which is further described in more detail.
The company is in distress to begin with; it is unclear, however, whether this is
because of financial difficulties only (i.e., it is nevertheless viable) or because the company
has an obsolete economic model (non-viable).
The game begins with a chance move, in which nature draws a true state of viability
ω ∈ Ω = {V,N} (viable or non-viable respectively) according to a joint unconditional
prior shared by all players Pr(V ) = µ ∈ (0, 1).10 The boundaries of the interval are
excluded to eliminate degenerate strategies—a boundary µ ∈ {0, 1} is the same as all
the players knowing the true state.
Once ω has been drawn, nature draws a noisy but (weakly) informative signal that
can be high or low, i ∈ {H,L}, which is only observed by the manager and cannot
be credibly communicated to the other players. Informativeness of the signal means
that Pr(H|V ) ≥ Pr(H|N). Noisiness means that neither signal results in certainty
(probability of 1 or 0). Formally, 1 > Pr(H|V ) ≥ Pr(H|N) > 0.
Hence, the manager receives a type characterized by the observed signal and updates
his prior in accordance with Bayes’ Rule to µH = Pr(V |H) = (Pr(H|V )Pr(V ))/Pr(H)
if the observed signal is high or to µL = Pr(V |L) = (Pr(L|V )Pr(V ))/Pr(L) if it is low.
Now,
1 = Pr(H|V ) + Pr(L|V )⇒ 1 = Pr(V |H)Pr(H)Pr(V ) +
Pr(V |L)Pr(L)
Pr(V )
⇒ µ = Pr(V ) = Pr(V |H)Pr(H) + Pr(V |L)Pr(L) = µHPr(H) + µL(1− Pr(H))
Furthermore, notice that Pr(H|V ) ≥ Pr(H|N) implies µH ≥ µL under the above
10Throughout, the notation Pr(X) denotes the probability of the event X obtaining. One can think
of the joint prior µ as the players’ best estimate of the a priori probability that the company is a viable
going concern.
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assumptions.11 The former is easier to manipulate while working with the model below
while the latter is a more apt and consistent assumption.
The intuitive way to understand the updated values is that the manager is privy to
some inside information that tells him whether the company is more or less likely to
be viable than implied by the publicly observed prior, edging his best estimate of the
viability probability up to µH or down to µL.
Once this updating has occurred, the manager has the move. The order of moves
proceeds as follows:
i. The manager can voluntarily file for bankruptcy (am = 1) or pass the move to the
creditors (am = 0). Formally, am ∈ Am := {1, 0}.
ii. The creditors, if the manager passes the move to them, can file for involuntary
bankruptcy (ac = 1) or refrain from action (ac = 0) and await a resolution of the
state of nature. Formally, ac ∈ Ac := {1, 0}.
iii. If a filing occurs, i.e., am = 1 or ac = 1, a court procedure begins. The party
filing the bankruptcy petition has the right to design an audit (or First Plan of
Reorganization) to obtain a public signal about the viability of the company. An
audit, more formally defined in Section 3, is modeled as a random mechanism which
produces a signal about the state of the company. The filing party can select such
a random mechanism, but both the mechanism and its outcome will be publicly
observable. The signal outcome can be either that the company is viable or not,
p ∈ {v, n}, and the filing party chooses the sensitivity of the audit mechanism, i.e.,
Pr(v|V ) and Pr(n|N).
iv. If a filing has occurred, the judge gets to move. She can liquidate (l) or reorganize
(r) the company and, in doing so, can either take into account the result of the
audit or ignore it. Formally, aj ∈ Aj := {l, r}. The type of strategic communication
11See Appendix A for a proof.
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Figure 1: Model timeline: Order of the stages of the Bankruptcy Persuasion Game.
game between a filing party and the judge is called a Bayesian Persuasion Game
(Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)—see below for a simple example of Bayesian
Persuasion.
v. Finally, nature reveals the state and payoffs realize in accordance with that state
and the actions of the players.
Next, in an example, I consider the behavior of players on what would eventually be
the unreached support of the equilibrium path. The purpose of the example is to shed
light on the dynamics of the court action. Note that while strictly speaking the choice of
µ is at odds with an implication of Assumptions 1 and 2, this choice is made deliberately
to elucidate player behavior in the unreached parts of the game tree.
Example 2.1. Take the Bankruptcy Persuasion Game and let the common prior about
the viability of the company be µ = 0.7. Also let Pr(H|V ) = Pr(H|N), thereby suspend-
ing the asymmetry of information that will be discussed in the next section. This is just
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so that for the sake of the example no implication about the manager type can be made
from his decision to pass to the creditors. The payoffs of the creditors are Uc(ω, 1, 0, r) =
Uc(ω, 0, 1, r) = Uc(ω, 0, 0, r) = Uc(ω, 0, 0, l) = 0 and Uc(ω, 1, 0, l) = Uc(ω, 0, 1, l) = 1. Re-
call that v and n are the outcomes of the public audit regarding the viability of the
company. Since liquidation is desired by the creditors, they will file for bankruptcy and
engage in a persuasion game with the judge by designing an audit (a public experiment)
comprised of two conditional probabilities Pr(v|V ) and Pr(n|N).
What signaling structure is optimal from the point of view of the creditors in order
for them to influence the judge to liquidate the company with as high a likelihood as
possible?
Consider the following naïve audit mechanism. The creditors may do nothing (or
engage in an uninformative audit), which would leave the conditional probabilities of
viability unchanged from the prior, i.e., µ = Pr(v|V ) = Pr(v|N). Since µ = 0.7, it would
be optimal for the judge to always reorganize, resulting in expected payoffs of Uj = 0.7
and Uc = 0 (the alternative, always liquidating, delivers Uj = 0.3 and mixed strategies
fall in between).
A perfectly informative signal, Pr(v|V ) = 1 and Pr(n|N) = 1, would result in the
judge’s always following the signal recommendation, resulting in expected payoffs of
Uj = 1 and Uc = 0.3. This is an improvement for the creditors from the naïve do-
nothing strategy, but can they do better?
A signaling structure of Pr(v|V ) = 4/7 and Pr(n|N) = 1 is optimal for the creditors
in this case. Furthermore, in equilibrium, the judge will conform to the signal recom-
mendation and reorganize companies for which there is a viable signal and liquidate the
ones for which there is a non-viable signal. I will first calculate the payoffs and then
verify the optimality of the strategies for both players.
12
For the creditors:
Uc = (Pr(v|V )Pr(V ) + Pr(v|N)Pr(V ))Uc(r)
+ (Pr(n|V )Pr(V ) + Pr(n|N)Pr(V ))Uc(l) = 0.6
For the judge:
Uj = Pr(v|V )Pr(V )Uj(V, r) + Pr(v|N)Pr(V )Uj(N, r)
+ Pr(n|V )Pr(V )Uj(V, l) + Pr(n|N)Pr(V )Uj(N, l) = 0.7
Note that by following the signal the judge is not worse off than having had no
information beyond µ. The creditors have improved significantly, however, going from
0 (without an informative public experiment), to 0.3 (with a perfectly informative one),
to 0.6 (with the above signaling structure). One way to interpret this is to see the error
rate of the judge as the scarce resource that the creditors are using. With the signaling
structure above the creditors have managed to “flip” all the errors that the judge would
make against them, in the absence of a public signal, into errors that go in their preferred
direction.
It now remains to show that this is indeed the optimal signaling structure in this
example. Can the creditors take this noisiness of the signal even further by making
Pr(n|N) = 1 and Pr(v|V ) < 4/7? If that were to happen, the judge would be better off
ignoring the signal altogether and always reorganizing regardless of what signal obtains.
This is easy to verify calculating payoffs just like above—following the signal would
deliver less than 0.7 to the judge, whereas always reorganizing delivers 0.7.
This last feature is what gives Bayesian Persuasion its name—a signal needs to be
Bayes Plausible12 to be followed. That is, the sender of the signal can only push it
so much before the posterior distribution becomes inconsistent with the prior and it
12Bayes Plausibility means nothing more than the judge being willing to update her beliefs in accor-
dance with Bayes’ Rule and not acting in a conditionally dominated manner.
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is optimal for the receiver to ignore the result of the audit (and other management-
commissioned reports and analyses).
Now briefly consider creditors who would prefer reorganization to liquidation if called
upon to move. If the rest of the parameters of the example stay the same, their best
course of action will be one of a large number of payoff-equivalent audits that result in
no new information for the judge. This, in turn, will lead to an optimal strategy for the
judge of always reorganizing. One of these strategies is Pr(n|N) = 0 and Pr(v|V ) = 1.
Thus, notice that the creditor-optimal Pr(v|V ) can take on different values in the unit
interval, depending on the preference specification for the creditors. This concludes the
example.
The judge’s objective is to take the appropriate action for the type of company she is
faced with. Let the judge’s payoff be given by a function Uj : Ω×Aj → R. In particular:
Assumption 1 (Judge Preferences). Uj(V, r) > Uj(V, l), Uj(N, l) > Uj(N, r), and
Uj(V, r)− Uj(V, l) = Uj(N, l)− Uj(N, r).
The first two conditions formalize the directive for bankruptcy judges to reorganize
viable going concerns and liquidate non-viable ones. The third one ensures symmetry
in the payoff of the judge (errors cost the same regardless of direction) and makes the
problem more tractable.
Furthermore, it is more interesting to hone in on situations, in which management
cannot rely on the trivial strategy of filing and then commissioning an uninformative
audit. Management might do that if the default action of the judge, with no extra
information beyond the shared µ, is reorganization. If that were the case for the judge,
there are, in fact, a continuum of such strategies for the manager. To avoid that, one
must hence make liquidation the default action of the judge. This intuition is formalized
in the next assumption.
Assumption 2 (Judge Default Action). µUj(V, r) + (1− µ)Uj(N, r) < µUj(V, l) + (1−
14
µ)Uj(N, l).
The creditors aim to maximize financial payoff which is given by a function Uc :
Ω × Am × Ac × Aj → R. That is, the creditors’ payoff depends on whether or not the
company is viable, ω ∈ Ω = {V,N}, whether or not one of the parties files for bankruptcy,
am ∈ Am = {0, 1} or ac ∈ Ac = {0, 1}, and on what the judge decides, aj ∈ Aj = {l, r}.
This formalizes creditors who are focused on financial returns and are not involved in
the operative business of the company. To make the problem interesting (i.e., provide
a reason for the parties to disagree), let the creditors have a conflict with management
over the preferred action of the judge, namely let the creditors prefer liquidation to
reorganization in the event of non-viability.
Note that it is a corollary of combining the first two assumptions that µ < 0.5. This
allows us to focus on the interesting case, in which the troubled company is of sufficiently
bad quality. In that case, a voluntary filing followed by no production of information
would result in a liquidation for sure, thereby forcing the manager to produce some
information via the audit.
Assumption 3 (Creditor Preferences). Uc(N, 0, 1, l) > Uc(N, 0, 1, r), Uc(N, 0, 0, l) =
Uc(N, 0, 0, r) and Uc(V, 0, 0, l) = Uc(V, 0, 0, r).
The latter two conditions simply reflect the idea that if the judge does not get to
move, she does not affect the payoff of the creditors.
Now consider the actions of the creditors in case they file. Let them pick some
optimal Pr(v|V ) = yc.
Assumption 4 (Creditor Default Action). µUc(V, 0, 0, aj) + (1 − µ)Uc(N, 0, 0, aj) <
maxyc{µycUc(V, 0, 1, r) + µ(1− yc)Uc(V, 0, 1, l)}+ (1− µ)Uc(N, 0, 1, l).
That is, the parameter constellation is such that if the manager passes the move to
the creditors, they would file for bankruptcy. If they would not, then there would be no
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conflict of interest between the manager and the creditors and the issue never ends up
in court.
The manager is better off not going through the uncertainty of bankruptcy. If he
feels that a filing by the creditors is imminent, however, he might as well file himself as
this gives him control over the process, which would turn out to be a valuable lever.
The manager’s objective is the continued existence of the company—this feature
naturally represents continued employment and the value of any equity compensation13.
Let the payoff of management be given by a function Um : Ω × Am × Ac × Aj → R
satisfying the following:
Assumption 5 (Manager Preferences).
Um(V, 0, 0, r) = Um(V, 0, 0, l) > Um(V, 1, 0, r) ≥ Um(V, 0, 1, r)
> Um(V, 1, 0, l) ≥ Um(V, 0, 1, l)
Um(N, 0, 0, r) = Um(N, 0, 0, l) > Um(N, 1, 0, r) ≥ Um(N, 0, 1, r)
> Um(N, 1, 0, l) ≥ Um(N, 0, 1, l)
The intuition is natural here—in either state of nature, the manager prefers to con-
tinue out of court. This models management that is able to control the company without
having to persuade a judge to make a determination. It prolongs the manager’s tenure
and allows him to “gamble for resurrection” in case the company is not viable. If the case
lands in court, the manager prefers a reorganization to a liquidation. Again, this models
a manager who wants to keep his job. Outcomes in which management initiates the
filing are weakly preferred to ones in which the creditors initiate the filing. This makes
sense as creditor-initiated (involuntary) filings result in the immediate termination of
management whereas management-initiated ones do not. Without a conflict of interest
13Eckbo, Thorburn, and Wang (2016) document that 15% of managers keep their jobs and do not
experience a compensation decrease.
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between the manager and the creditors, the problem would be much less interesting and
the last three assumptions guarantee that.
What differentiates the model of Bayesian Persuasion in this paper from most of
the literature is the information asymmetry. Here management, as the insider, has ex-
tra information which cannot, however, be credibly communicated. The study of the
Bankruptcy Persuasion Game with asymmetric information, as described above, repre-
sents a twofold contribution: on the one hand, it is an application of Bayesian Persuasion
to the bankruptcy setting—it is both a natural setting and once that helps resolve an
economic puzzle. On the other hand, the paper adds to the literature that studies
Bayesian Persuasion with asymmetric information. Management, who has received a
private signal, has a natural informational advantage over the remaining players in the
form of a more precise estimate of the state of nature. When Pr(H|V ) = Pr(H|N), the
two types collapse into one and the informational asymmetry disappears, nesting the
typical Bayesian Persuasion game model.
2.1 Solution Concept
The solution concept used in this paper is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with
ties broken by the preference of the party filing for bankruptcy. It turns out that only
requiring Nash in the model introduced above delivers a multiplicity of equilibria. This
section gives a brief overview of PBE. For a more general treatment, the reader is referred
to Ritzberger (2002).
The goal of this refinement is to deliver for games of imperfect information a solution
concept that is consistent with backward induction. Every player in the (extensive form)
game is a Bayesian, in the sense that he or she has a “belief,” a probability distribution,
at each (non-singleton) information set as to which node within the information set he or
she is at. PBE does not go as far as possible in delivering on this goal because there are
no constraints on the beliefs of different players and inconsistencies can still cause non-
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credible threats. PBE ensures, however, that the behavior of players is not “conditionally
irrational”—every player must have a behavior strategy at every information set of the
game form that is (weakly) optimal given the set of beliefs the player holds, whether or
not that information set can be reached.
In this model, PBE has bite insofar as the strategy of the judge is an object of interest.
She may condition her actions on the signal that is produced in the audit commissioned
by the manager (or the creditors). Furthermore, her default action, absent an informative
signal, is not in the interest of the manager. Thus, the chosen audit of management has
to be Bayes Plausible and (weakly) induce the judge to act on the audit outcome. The
alternative would lead to a potential breakdown of the persuasion mechanism by a judge
who chooses to follow a strategy involving the non-credible threat to punish all strategies
that do not deliver her bliss point with an action that results in a low utility for the
filing party.
3 Solution of the Model
The approach to solving the model is to constrain the strategy space of the players under
PBE to those that are not conditionally dominated. Once several restrictions are made,
I will show the uniqueness of the PBE of the BPG.
Recall from the example that the two probabilities Pr(v|V ) and Pr(n|N), taken
together, constitute the audit that is commissioned. All players observe these probabil-
ities.
Lemma 3.1. A manager who rationally files for bankruptcy picks Pr(v|V ) = 1 in any
PBE.
Proof. Suppose there were a PBE, in which a manager filed and picked Pr(v|V ) < 1.
The judge has 4 available pure strategies in this game for every observed choice of
Pr(v|V ) and Pr(n|N):
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i. always liquidate, regardless of the signal,
ii. always reorganize, regardless of the signal,
iii. follow the signal, i.e., reorganize if the observed signal is viable and liquidate if the
observed signal is non-viable, and
iv. go against the signal, i.e., reorganize if the observed signal is non-viable and liqui-
date if the observed signal is viable.
The fourth strategy occurs when the signal is informative in reverse.14 This is equiv-
alent to the third strategy up to a relabeling of signal names, so henceforth only the first
three strategies will be addressed.
In the first case, the judge always liquidates. The filing manager is getting his
lowest payoff (see Assumption 1) for sure. Simply deviating to Pr(v|V ) = Pr(n|N) = 1,
which the judge will accept, as this gives her best payoff, would be profitable because
Um(V, 1, 0, r) > Um(V, 1, 0, l). Hence this candidate cannot be an equilibrium.
In the second case, the judge always reorganizes. Now either the creditors pass or
they file for bankruptcy. In the former case the filing manager type has an incentive to
deviate and in the latter the passing one does.
In the third case, the judge follows the signal. If this were the case, increasing
Pr(v|V ) to 1 improves both the filer’s and the judge’s payoff. If the judge followed the
signal with the lower Pr(v|V ), then she would still do that with Pr(v|V ) = 1. This
strategy was available to the non-filing type previously as well, but he did not pick it
(instead choosing to pass) so he will still pass now that the filing type has deviated to
Pr(v|V ) = 1. Thus, this candidate is also not an equilibrium. This covers all possible
cases and the proof is now complete.
14Similar to circumstances in which it is helpful to listen to advice from someone who is always wrong
if only to then turn around and do the opposite of their advice.
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One important point in the proof above that should be stressed is that given that the
judge’s default action is adverse to the manager, a rational manager would never com-
mission an audit that specifies a mechanism which is outright ignored by the judge. Such
a strategy would be quite obviously dominated by, among others, a perfectly informative
audit.
The notion of the lemma overall is also quite intuitive. A filing manager aims to
“flip” the errors of the judge, which are the scarce resource. Whereas without any
additional information these errors would be contrary to the manager’s interests, with
the signal information, it would be optimal for the manager if the errors went to further
his interests. Hence, it would be ideal, from the point of view of the manager, if all of
the judge’s mistakes further the interests of the manager.
Now that we have pruned the strategy space of the manager types given a true
viable state, we are ready to pin down their strategy even further. To be able to refer
to their strategy concisely, let the creditors, if called upon, pick Pr(v|V ) = yc ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, let the high and the low type manager choose xH and xL respectively for
the value of Pr(n|N).
Proposition 3.2. The BPG has no separating PBE.
Proof. A separating equilibrium between the two types of managers can obtain in one
of two ways:
i. both types of manager file for bankruptcy but pick xH 6= xL,
ii. one type of manager files for voluntary bankruptcy, while the other one passes the
move to the creditors.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 3.1. that a filing manager would never rationally
pick a signal structure in bankruptcy that the judge would ignore.
As for case i., suppose there were a separating equilibrium, in which both types of
managers file for bankruptcy. Then it must be that xH 6= xL since the sensitivity of
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the experiment contingent on the non-viable state of nature is the only means through
which the types can separate. Also, neither type would choose an xi that would result
in liquidation for sure as that is the least desirable outcome for either manager and can
be preempted by a perfectly informative signal.
But in equilibrium neither type would have an incentive to deviate from their chosen
xi and imitate the other type. Hence, given the payoffs above, we have:
µHUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1− µH)(1− xH)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1− µH)xHUm(N, 1, 0, l)
≥ µHUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1− µH)(1− xL)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1− µH)xLUm(N, 1, 0, l)
(1)
µLUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1− µL)(1− xL)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1− µL)xLUm(N, 1, 0, l)
≥ µLUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1− µL)(1− xH)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1− µL)xHUm(N, 1, 0, l)
(2)
Canceling out, and since Um(N, 1, 0, r)−Um(N, 1, 0, l) > 0 by Assumption 1, dividing
through by it, it follows that:
xH ≤ xL
xL ≤ xH
.
The only possible solution of this system of inequalities is xH = xL, which contradicts
the premise of this candidate being a separating equilibrium in the first place.
In the case ii., if one type of manager files and the other one does not, from Assump-
tion 4, we have Uc(N, 0, 1, l) > Uc(N, 0, 1, r). Hence if the creditors file, Pr(n|N) = 1.
Recall that the creditors, if called upon, pick Pr(v|V ) = yc ∈ [0, 1]. This, combined with
Assumption 1 gives us
xiUm(N, 0, 1, r) + (1− xi)Um(N, 0, 1, l) > Um(N, 0, 1, l)
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for any xi ∈ (0, 1] and hence
µ¯Um(N, 0, 1, r) + (1− µ¯)xiUm(N, 0, 1, r) + (1− µ¯)(1− xi)Um(N, 0, 1, l)
> µ¯ycUm(N, 0, 1, r) + µ¯(1− yc)Um(N, 0, 1, l) + Um(N, 0, 1, l)
for any µ¯ ∈ (0, 1). In particular, the updated prior of the non-filing type is in that
interval. The inequality, however, shows that this manager has a profitable deviation by
changing his strategy from not filing to filing, which contradicts the premise of the case.
This result tells us that better private information, while beneficial for the manager’s
payoff, does not really allow him to take any different actions to further profit from
the information (and potentially share those profits with the judge or the creditors).
Compared to a situation where types would be verifiable, the high type loses out and
the low type gets a higher payoff.
I next examine the strategy of the judge. The input information she has at her
disposal is comprised of the identity of the filing party (M or C), the mechanism selected
by that party (the numerical values for Pr(v|V ) and Pr(n|N)), and the resulting public
signal (v or n). The judge can either choose to ignore the latter signal or, without loss
of generality, follow its recommendation.15 If the judge chooses to ignore the signal, she
can choose any mixed strategy of liquidating or reorganizing. Since µ < 0.5, however,
liquidating dominates reorganizing and a rational judge would not choose the latter.
Thus, the strategy of a rational judge is reduced to a mixed strategy of following the
signal and liquidating. I will parametrize this strategy by the weight on following the
signal, q, with the weight on liquidating being (1− q).
Recall that if the manager files, Pr(v|V ) = 1 regardless of type (similarly, if the
creditors file Pr(n|N) = 1). Thus the actual input variable of interest (if, without loss
15While it is possible for the judge to always go against the recommendation of the signal this is
tantamount to a relabeling of the signals and results in analogous analysis. See the discussion in the
proof of Lemma 3.1.
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of generality, the manager files) is Pr(n|N) = x.
Example 3.1. Consider a numerical example of a Bankruptcy Persuasion Game, in
which µ = 0.3, Pr(H|V ) = Pr(H|N). The payoffs of the manager are Um(ω, 1, 0, r) =
Um(ω, 0, 1, r) = Um(ω, 0, 0, r) = Um(ω, 0, 0, l) = 1 and Um(ω, 1, 0, l) = Um(ω, 0, 1, l) = 0,
∀ω ∈ Ω. The payoffs of the judge are Uj(V, r) = Uj(N, l) = 1 and Uj(V, l) = Uj(N, r) =
0. For the creditors 1 = Uc(V, 0, 1, l) > Uc(V, 0, 1, r) = 0 and 1 = Uc(N, 0, 1, l) >
Uc(N, 0, 1, r) = 0, and 1 > µH > µL > 0. Now consider the following strategy combina-
tion:
i. the creditors always file for involuntary bankruptcy and push for liquidation,
ii. the manager picks an audit parametrized by Pr(n|N) = 0.7, and
iii. the judge’s strategy is as follows: for Pr(n|N) ∈ [0, 0.7) ∪ [0.8, 0.9), liquidate and
for Pr(n|N) ∈ [0.7, 0.8) ∪ [0.9, 1], follow the signal realization.
This strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium. To quickly verify, no player has incen-
tive to unilaterally deviate:
i. the creditors never get to move, but their strategy makes the manager file for
bankruptcy,
ii. the manager, upon filing for bankruptcy, would be worse off if he were to decrease
Pr(n|N), because he would face certain liquidation. He’d also be worse off by
increasing Pr(n|N) because µiUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1 − µi)(0.7)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1 −
µi)(0.3)Um(N, 1, 0, l) > µiUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1 − µi)(0.7 + δ)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1 −
µi)(0.3− δ)Um(N, 1, 0, l) for δ > 0 because Um(N, 1, 0, r) > Um(N, 1, 0, l), and
iii. given the above strategies, the judge is better off following the signal than always
liquidating at the point Pr(n|N) = 0.7, so there is no profitable deviation for her
either.
23
There is an issue with the equilibrium in Example 3.1, in particular with the off-
equilibrium part of the judge’s strategy, which is not a monotonic function of xi. Consider
a strategy for the judge given by liquidating for Pr(n|N) ∈ [0, 0.7) and following the
signal for Pr(n|N) ∈ [0.7, 1]. Notice that this strategy delivers the same payoffs as the one
in the example above but does require the judge to take conditionally suboptimal actions
for the off-equilibrium values of Pr(n|N) ∈ [0.8, 0, 9). Intuitively speaking, strategies
that “jump up and down” can be equilibrium strategies but there is an equilibrium
strategy that delivers the same outcome with at most one jump and it is that one which
will survive the refinement of the solution concept. The conditionally suboptimal off-
equilibrium behavior is eliminated by using Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium instead of Nash
and takes us to the following lemma.
(0,0)
(0,1)
(1,0) x
q
Figure 3: Example 3.1. One strategy for the judge (the function represented by the
thick line in the graph above) which could be consistent with a Nash equilibrium but
is not consistent with a PBE. This equilibrium seems unreasonable in the sense that it
uses strategies that employ conditionally dominated strategies off the equilibrium path.
E.g., for a judge might threaten liquidation for Pr = 0.85 but a rational judge who finds
herself in that information set would instead be better of following the signal.
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Lemma 3.3. In any PBE, the judge’s probability weight on following the signal of the
(manager-commissioned) audit, q, is a non-decreasing function of Pr(n|N).
Proof. Notice that the manager is best off picking the lowest value of Pr(n|N) for which
the company does not get liquidated for sure (because Um(N, 1, 0, r) > Um(N, 1, 0, l)).
Also notice that for Pr(n|N) = 0 the judge should always liquidate and for Pr(n|N) = 1
she should follow the signal. In fact, there is an infimum of Pr(n|N) in the judge’s
strategy for which the judge switches to following the signal rather than always liqui-
dating. A strategy for the judge that follows the signal for all values of Pr(n|N) above
that infimum delivers the same equilibrium payoff as the original strategy. Wherever
the two strategies disagree off the equilibrium path, it is the original strategy that is
conditionally dominated.
Before the next proposition, one should note that the model as described has a PBE
for some parameter constellations that results in neither the manager nor the creditors
filing for bankruptcy. This PBE, however, results from parameter constellations that
violate Assumption 4. In the real world, those are troubled companies in which neither
stakeholder files, but an out-of-court agreement is reached. These workouts are not
present in the stylized facts that this model aims to explain.
Lemma 3.4 (Voluntary Bankruptcy Condition). In any PBE under Assumptions
1 through 5 above, the manager files for voluntary bankruptcy if and only if the creditors,
if called upon to move, file for bankruptcy.
Proof. “Only if” Recall the definition of yc. They pick some Pr(v|V ) = yc ∈
argmax{µycUc(V, 0, 1, r) + µ(1 − yc)Uc(V, 0, 1, l) + (1 − µ)Uc(V, 0, 1, l)}. That is, yc
is an optimal choice for the creditors. Now, the creditors not filing for bankruptcy,
if called upon, means that µUc(V, 0, 0, aj) + (1 − µ)Uc(N, 0, 0, aj) > µycUc(V, 0, 0, r) +
µ(1−yc)Uc(V, 0, 0, l)+(1−µ)Uc(V, 0, 0, l). Since we have Um(ω, 0, 0, r) = Um(ω, 0, 0, l) >
Um(ω, 1, 0, r), ∀ω ∈ Ω, then the manager, if he expects the creditors to pass, would also
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find it optimal to pass rather than to file for bankruptcy.
“If” Now let the creditors have a yc such that they find it optimal to file for
bankruptcy. That is µUc(V, 0, 0, aj) + (1 − µ)Uc(N, 0, 0, aj) < µycUc(V, 0, 0, r) + µ(1 −
yc)Uc(V, 0, 0, l)+(1−µ)Uc(V, 0, 0, l). Their filing would leave the manager worse off than if
he files himself because µiycUm(V, 0, 1, r)+µi(1−yc)Um(V, 0, 1, l)+(1−µi)Um(N, 0, 1, l) <
µiUm(V, 1, 0, r) + (1− µi)(1− x)Um(N, 1, 0, r) + (1− µi)xUm(N, 1, 0, l).
This lemma delivers a central intuition of this paper. Whenever the manager files for
bankruptcy, he does so in order to remain in the driver’s seat of the bankruptcy process
and not let a creditor with divergent interests take over the process to management’s
detriment. This is one explanation of why the vast majority of bankruptcy filings in the
U.S. are voluntary (i.e., management, rather than the creditors, initiated the filing).
Now, adding Assumption 5 to the above would ensure that the creditors, if given
the move, would file. Expecting this, a rational manager would preemptively file, thus
delivering the unique PBE of the BPG that is described in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Any Bankruptcy Persuasion Game that satisfies Assumptions 1 through
5 has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. It is either an equilibrium in which the
manager and the creditors pick am = ac = 0 or one in which the manager picks am = 1.
In the latter case both manager types pick Pr(v|V ) = 1 and Pr(n|N) = (1− 2µ)/(1−µ),
the judge follows the signal and the creditors maximize their payoffs contingent on getting
the move. The expected payoffs of the players are:
i. for the manager: µi + (1− xi)(1− µi), where i ∈ {H,L},
ii. for the creditors: µUc(V, 1, 0, r) + µUc(N, 1, 0, r) + (1− 2µ)Uc(N, 0, 1, l), and
iii. for the judge: (1− µ).
Proof. As observed above, if the creditors would file (Assumption 5), the manager would
file first. So far we have pruned the candidate equilibria substantially. By Lemma
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3.4. and Assumption 5, we can only have equilibria in which both the creditors (if given
the move) and the manager file for bankruptcy. By Lemma 3.3. the judge’s strategy
is a non-decreasing function of Pr(n|N) when the manager files. Furthermore, the two
manager types file and choose the same audit mechanism by Proposition 3.2. I will now
propose a strategy combination and verify that it is a PBE. Then I will demonstrate
that every alternative candidate includes strategies that are conditionally dominated for
the judge, thereby completing the proof.
I will argue that the following strategy combination is a PBE:
i. both manager types go into voluntary bankruptcy and pick Pr(v|V ) = 1 and
Pr(n|N) = (1− 2µ)/(1− µ),
ii. the judge, indifferent between conforming to the signal or always liquidating, fol-
lows the recommendation of the signal, and
iii. the creditors never get to move on the equilibrium path, but off the equilibrium
path, they file for bankruptcy themselves.
I will first demonstrate that the strategy given above is an equilibrium. Then I will
proceed to prove its uniqueness.
I will first specify the set of off-equilibrium beliefs of the judge. Let her believe that
any manager who specifies a mechanism with Pr(n|N) < (1 − 2µ)/(1 − µ) is running a
non-viable company with a probability greater than half and hence she would mandate
the liquidation of such companies.
Recall that, it is a strictly dominant strategy for either type of manager to set
Pr(v|V ) = 1 if he files (Lemma 3.1.).
Neither type of manager has an incentive to deviate from Pr(n|N) = (1−2µ)/(1−µ),
because a deviation would either result in immediate liquidation (if the deviation is to
a lower value given the judge’s beliefs) or would be a dominated strategy (decreasing
Pr(n|N) to (1 − 2µ)/(1 − µ) would result in a higher payoff for the manager). The
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creditors do not get to move on the equilibrium path. The equilibrium is supported off
the equilibrium path by a bankruptcy filing by the creditors, should they get the move,
which is rational by Assumption 5. This, in turn, ensures that the manager will file (by
Lemma 3.4.). The judge is weakly better off following the signal produced by the audit
than ignoring it. Thus, this strategy combination is a PBE. The payoffs are:
i. for the manager: Um = µi + (1− 1−2µ1−µ )(1− µi) = µ1−µ + µi 1−2µ1−µ ,
ii. for the judge: Uj = (1−µ), which is no worse (in fact exactly equal) to the judge’s
alternative course of action, always liquidating, and
iii. for the creditors, who never get to move, Uc = µUc(V, 1, 0, r) + µUc(N, 1, 0, r) +
(1− 2µ)Uc(N, 1, 0, l).
Having established existence, I next turn to uniqueness. Notice that the equilibrium
above is not the only Nash Equilibrium of the BPG. In particular for some real ∆ > 0 any
Pr(n|N) = (1−2µ)/(1−µ)+∆ > (1−2µ)/(1−µ) would also be a Nash equilibrium if the
judge were to enforce it with the same type of extreme beliefs described above. Namely,
if the judge threatens that she would liquidate for any Pr(n|N) 6= (1− 2µ)/(1− µ) + ∆
and that threat is taken at face value by the other players. Such a strategy on behalf of
the judge would, however, be “conditionally irrational.” This conditionally dominated
strategy at an unreached information set of the judge is excluded by the PBE solution
concept.
To see this, let management pick Pr(v|V ) = 1 and, crucially, Pr(n|N) = (1−2µ)/(1−
µ) + ∆/2. Contingent upon obtaining the move from management, the judge has an
incentive to deviate from her stated strategy. Liquidating would deliver her a payoff of
(1− µ) while following the signal would deliver µ+ ((1− 2µ)/(1− µ) + ∆/2)(1− µ) >
µ + (1 − 2µ)(1 − µ)/(1 − µ) = 1 − µ. Thus, a rational judge who does not employ
non-credible threats would follow the signal rather than the strategy which enforces a
higher precision in the non-viable state of nature.
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This argument leads to Pr(n|N) = (1− 2µ)/(1− µ) as the highest Pr(n|N) that the
judge can credibly enforce.
This result establishes the unique PBE of the game and thus enables us to derive
testable predictions. While viable companies are reorganized more often than non-viable
ones, judges are unable to tell the companies apart and there is no incentive for managers
of better companies to differentiate themselves through their actions. This result is novel
and demonstrates that in a Bayesian Persuasion Game a pooling equilibrium obtains
despite asymmetric information.
Furthermore, it is interesting that since the private information bears no consequence
on management’s strategy and the original µ is correct in an expected value sense, the
expected payoff of management is changed by the realization of the signal but not by
whether there is a private signal stage or not. Thus, a rational manager would not be
willing to pay extra for information about the status of the company as this information
provides no strategic advantage.
4 Conclusion
This paper makes three distinct contributions. Firstly, it proposes a potential explana-
tion for the observed pattern of voluntary bankruptcy filings and the high proportion
of companies that have been reorganized by U.S. courts that arguably should not have
been. Persuasion is the mechanism of the economic interaction, as contrasted with the
negotiation lens that the bankruptcy literature has taken thus far. This mechanism has
implications for the behavior of the management of companies in distress. Managers
will undertake voluntary filings. The behavior of high- and low-type managers would be
indistinguishable.
Secondly, the paper presents a very natural application of the methodology of Bayesian
Persuasion. While in some other applications the commitment of management might
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be an unrealistic assumption, in this case, it conforms to the institutional detail of out-
side certification of viability through auditors, investment bankers, and other external
advisors.
Finally, the paper adds to the literature on Bayesian Persuasion with asymmetric
information, whereby it is differentiated by a binary signal. This, in turn, implies that
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium delivers a unique equilibrium in the game and thereby
delivers testable predictions. In addition to exclusively observing voluntary chapter 11
filings, in which management is pushing to increase the likelihood of a reorganization,
one would expect no investment by management in finding out the true state of nature.
Neither would one expect the manager’s actions to betray his type. Lastly, the judge
should be expected to follow the recommendations of management-commissioned reports
and audits.
Further work left for future research includes an empirical analysis of the predictions
of this paper, the conducting of a welfare analysis, the introduction of side bets (for
the manager) on the state of nature, and an extension of the model to accommodate a
continuous state space. It would be interesting to be able to compare the U.S. mechanism
to other mechanisms known from international practices, e.g., bankruptcy auctions.
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A Proof of Pr(H|V ) ≥ Pr(H|N)⇒ µH ≥ µL
Recall that there are two possible true states, {V,N}, and two possible signals, {H,L}
and all four event combinations in the Cartesian product of these sets have nonzero prob-
abilities. Beginning with Pr(H|V ) ≥ Pr(H|N) and restating in terms of the constituent
events yields:
Pr(H ∩ V )
Pr(H ∩ V ) + Pr(L ∩ V ) ≥
Pr(H ∩N)
Pr(H ∩N) + Pr(L ∩N)
Taking reciprocals and reversing the direction of the inequality yields:
Pr(H ∩ V ) + Pr(L ∩ V )
Pr(H ∩ V ) ≤
Pr(H ∩N) + Pr(L ∩N)
Pr(H ∩N)
⇔ 1 + Pr(L ∩ V )Pr(H ∩ V ) ≤ 1 +
Pr(L ∩N)
Pr(H ∩N) ⇔
Pr(L ∩ V )
Pr(H ∩ V ) ≤
Pr(L ∩N)
Pr(H ∩N)
Multiplying through by Pr(H ∩N)/Pr(L ∩ V ) results in:
Pr(H ∩N)
Pr(H ∩ V ) ≤
Pr(L ∩N)
Pr(L ∩ V ) ⇔
Pr(H ∩N)
Pr(H ∩ V ) + 1 ≤
Pr(L ∩N)
Pr(L ∩ V ) + 1
⇔ Pr(H ∩ V ) + Pr(H ∩N)Pr(H ∩ V ) ≤
Pr(L ∩ V ) + Pr(L ∩N)
Pr(L ∩ V )
Again taking reciprocals yields:
Pr(H ∩ V )
Pr(H ∩ V ) + Pr(H ∩N) ≥
Pr(L ∩ V )
Pr(L ∩ V ) + Pr(L ∩N)
Finally, restating again in terms of conditional probabilities yields:
µH = Pr(V |H) ≥ Pr(V |L) = µL
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